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Abstract: 
It is common to limit the cost sharing in health insurance schemes by a cap on 
co-insurance payments. This paper derives the economic and welfare effects of 
such a cap, adopting a model of which two features are crucial. First, health 
care demand is price-elastic. Second, demand is less elastic the worser the 
consumer’s health status. The paper derives that a cap induces optimizing 
health insurers to raise the co-insurance rate. This raises welfare in the 
aggregate, but part of the consumers do not share in this welfare gain. In 
particular, those with health spending close to the level at which co-insurance 
payments reach their maximum level suffer large welfare losses. We adopt a 3-
state model to derive our results and a continuous-state model for a numerical 
illustration. 
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Throughout the world, health insurance schemes feature capped co-insurance.1 
This may sound obvious since without co-insurance moral hazard would 
increase the demand for health care too much. By the same token, the use of a 
cap is obvious as not using it might impose too much risk on consumers. 
Indeed, capped insurance may be better in welfare terms than no insurance or 
full insurance. This accords with a considerable literature that suggests that 
optimal insurance is a form of partial insurance, striking a balance between the 
welfare loss from moral hazard and the welfare gain from risk sharing (Pauly 
1968; Zeckhauser 1970; Besley 1988; Manning and Marquis 1996; Blomqvist 
1997).2  
Surprisingly, there is little literature on the effects of imposing a cap on co-
insurance payments. This paper explores the economic, distributional and 
welfare effects of introducing a cap. It analyses the features of an optimal co-
insurance scheme in a world in which insurers can apply a co-insurance rate up 
to a certain maximum and full insurance beyond that point. Two features of the 
demand for health care services will prove to be relevant: demand is price-
 
1 For example, in the United States, the Affordable Care Act requires that all health plans limit participant out-of-pocket 
(OOP) maximums.  The Netherlands use deductibles in their insurance scheme, which - by construction - maximize OOP 
payments to the amount of the deductible. Insurance schemes with caps on co-payments can also be found in other 
countries, such as Austria, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland (OECD 2015). 
2 There is a large literature on optimal coinsurance schemes. For example, Besley (1988) shows that optimal 
coinsurance rates will generally be different for different types of health care, Ellis and McGuire (1990) and Ma and McGuire 
(1997) point to the interaction between supplier cost sharing and coinsurance policies and Newhouse (2006) and Chandra, 
Gruber and McKnight (2010) underline the role of offset effects. Glazer and McGuire (2012) discusses the welfare impact of 
these offset effects and the role of insurance. Nyman (1999) stresses that without health insurance, some (very expensive) 
medical services would not be affordable. Newhouse (2006) explores the role ofa lack of will power on part of patients and 
Pauly and Blavin (2008) that of information imperfections on part of patients.  
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elastic, and the (absolute value of the) price elasticity is decreasing with health 
status. Hence, the worser someone’s health, the less price-elastic his or her 
demand for health care services will be. 
We derive first that, generally, the optimal co-insurance rate can take any 
positive value and is not restricted to be equal or smaller than unity. The reason 
is that redistribution may imply both a lower or a higher co-insurance rate.  If 
we impose the institutional requirement that the co-insurance rate cannot 
exceed one, our analysis thus implies that in some cases optimal policies will 
feature a deductible. Second, for the case in which the optimal co-insurance rate 
is strictly between zero and one, we restate the result established by many 
others that the optimal co-insurance rate is increasing in the price elasticity of 
health care demand. Thirdly, we will show that the optimal maximum of co-
insurance payments is finite. Hence, any co-insurance scheme without an upper 
bound to co-insurance payments must be suboptimal. Fourthly, due to the 
properties of health care demand, the introduction of a cap on insurance 
increases the price-elasticity of health care spending below the cap, and thus 
enforces health insurers to raise the co-insurance rate. This is interesting in 
itself, but it also implies that the redistributional effects of the introduction of a 
cap on co-insurance payments are very uneven. In particular, consumers whose 
spending on health care is just below the imposed cap may face a steep increase 
in co-insurance payments due to the rising optimal co-insurance rate.  
We use a simple model to derive our results. In this model there is just one 
medical product, and consumers are allocated to three possible health states. In 
the first costs are zero. In the second state the out-of pocket price is positive, 
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but costs are below a co-payment maximum. In the third state health 
expenditures exceed that maximum and the out-of-pocket price is zero. 
Subsequently, we present a second model that extends this simple framework to 
one that allows for a continuum of health states and two medical products. 
Numerical simulations with this extended model suggest that the results from 
the simple model are non-trivial. 
There are several contributions to the literature that relate to our work. Like 
us, Keeler, Newhouse and Phelps (1977), Ellis (1986), Manning and Marquis 
(1996) and Kowalski (2012) use models with nonlinear budget constraints. 
However, they do not explore the implications for optimal cost sharing. 
Finkelstein and McKnight (2008) and Engelhardt and Gruber (2011) do assess 
the welfare implications of moral hazard and risk reduction, but they apply 
separate models to assess the changes in moral hazard and risk reduction, and 
the associated welfare effects. This approach may be too rough to find an 
optimal scheme: we prefer to assess these changes simultaneously.Closely 
related are also Besley (1988) and Goldman and Philipson (2007) who show 
theoretically the relation between the optimal co-insurance rate and the price 
elasticity of demand, and Einav, Finkelstein and Polyakova (2016) who present 
empirical evidence for this relationship in the case of prescription drugs. Also 
related is the work of Drèze and Schokkaert (2013) on the optimality of 
deductibles when demand for health care is subject to ex post moral hazard, and 
Blomqvist (1997) on optimal nonlinear health insurance schemes. 
The structure of our paper is as follows. Section 2 elaborates the three-state 
model and section 3 explains the results graphically. Section 4 discusses the 
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continuous-state model. Section 5 presents the results of numerical simulations 
with the latter model. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Optimal co-insurance in a three-state world 
 
In this section we consider a model that distinguishes three states for health care 
demand: zero demand, positive and price-elastic demand and positive and 
price-inelastic demand. Basically, the analysis in this section confirms the result 
derived by many others (Pauly (1968), Zeckhauser (1970), Besley (1988) and 
Goldman and Philipson (2007)) that the optimal co-insurance rate is increasing 
in the price elasticity of health care demand (in absolute terms). Here, we add 
two things, namelythat this result does not hold generally and that there is also 
an optimal co-insurance maximum that relates to the optimal co-insurance rate. 
 
2.1 The model 
We adopt a representative-agent approach. Hence, ex ante all consumers are 
alike. Ex post however, heterogeneity steps in as people who are identical from 
an ex ante view encounter different shocks to their health. In other respects, our 
model is as stylized as possible: we abstain from modelling explicitly the role 
of suppliers, information imperfections and any offset effects. 
Ellis and McGuire (1990) and Eggleston (2000) use a quadratic specification 
to describe the relation between utility and medical care. We adopt their 
approach,  primarily for two reasons. First, quadratic utility implies that the 
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marginal utility of health drops to zero for some finite amount of care. This 
allows us to describe demand also in case of a zero out-of-pocket price, which 
is quite common in health care. Second, there is empirical evidence that health 
care demand is less price-elastic for higher amounts of health care spending. 
For example, Wedig (1988) already has found that the price elasticity of health 
care demand is smaller the worse the health status of the patient. Newhouse and 
the Insurance Experiment Group (1993), Van Vliet (2001), Zhou et al. (2011) 
and Chandra, Gruber and McKnight (2014) present evidence that the demand 
for expensive inpatient hospital services is less price-elastic than that for less 
expensive alternative medical services. Moreover, Strombom, Buchmueller and 
Feldstein (2002) and Buchmueller (2006) have found that, compared to 
workers, the demand for health insurance by retirees is little price-elastic; the 
same holds true for the demand by people who are older and who have been 
recently hospitalized or diagnosed with cancer. The quadratic specification is 
consistent with this evidence: it implies that the price elasticity of health care 
demand is decreasing in health status and spending. Moreover, it also implies 
that the price elasticity of health care demand is increasing in the co-insurance 
rate (see Appendix A). This is backed by empirical evidence as well (Phelps 
and Newhouse 1974).  
The quadratic form has a drawback as it implies that risk aversion is 
increasing in income. In our analysis, this argument has little weight since we 
do not account for income heterogeneity. In section 5 we will explore 
alternative co-insurance schemes that differ in terms of premium. We will see 
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that the implied differences in disposable income are too small to exert 
important effects upon risk aversion. 
If u denotes the consumer’s direct utility, z the consumption of health care, c 
consumption of non-medical services and y consumer’s gross income, then we 
have the following utility function: 
2 21 1
2 2
0 1/ , 0




   
  
 (1) 
The range of the parameter β assures that the marginal utility of non-medical 
consumption, 1 y , is always positive. The parameter γ differs across states 
of health. This reflects patient heterogeneity in terms of health status. Health 
status affects utility as bad health increases the efficacy of medical care. Indeed, 
(1) implies that the marginal utility of health care consumption z   is 
increasing in  . Preferences for medical and non-medical consumption in (1) 
are separable. Finkelstein, Luttmer and Notowidigdo (2013) have shown 
empirical evidence for a non-separable form in which the marginal utility of 
non-medical consumption declines when health deteriorates. This has a similar 
effect as our specification, namely shifting the consumption basket away from 
non-medical goods and towards health care when health deteriorates. 
The rate of co-insurance is denoted as b with 0 1b  . We use t to denote 
the producer price of medical services, so bt measures the out-of-pocket price. 
On account of the maximum to co-insurance payments m, the budget constraint 





c y p btz z
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 (2) 
Here, p denotes the health insurance premium. 
The consumer maximizes (1), subject to (2), given the value of the parameter 
γ that reflects his health status. Principally, this problem is non-standard due to 
the two-part structure for the price of medical services. We will elaborate on the 
implications of this later, when we discuss the continuous-state version of our 
model. For now, we assume that γ can take only three values. 
First,   can be 1 , which is such that 1 0z  . This characterizes a relatively 
healthy consumer with zero health care demand. Second,  can be 2 1  , with  
2 (1 ( )) 0bt y p     . This characterizes a patient in need of health care and 
for whom co-insurance payments are strictly positive, but below the maximum 
m. For this patient, higher spending implies higher co-insurance payments. 
Thirdly,   may be 3 2   which implies that health care demand is sufficiently 
large to make the consumer pay the maximum of co-insurance payments m. The 
exogenous probabilities associated with the three cases are denoted as 1 0  , 
2 0  and 3 0  . 



























An important feature is that demand is price-elastic only in the second state. 
Demand in states 1 and 3 is inelastic, albeit for different reasons. Using 
equations (2) and (1), it is straightforward to derive also expressions for non-
medical consumption and utility in the three states distinguished, ic  and iu , 
1, 2,3i  . 
We assume that the health insurance industry is perfectly competitive and 
features zero administration costs. This is fully equivalent to the assumption of 
a national insurer, given that adverse selection does not play any role in our 
paper – due to the assumption that agents are identical before the realization of 
shocks. Hence, health insurance premiums equal health spending minus co-
insurance payments: 
  
2 2 3 3(1 ) ( )p b tz tz m                           (4) 
2.2 The optimal co-insurance rate 
Before the occurrence of health shocks, the representative health insurer 
chooses the co-insurance rate and co-insurance maximum that  maximizes 
expected utility:  
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1 1 2 2 3 3( )E U u u u                                                                                (5) 











        (6)
     
where   is a help variable, defined as 1 1 2 2 3 3 2( ) /        , and i
1,2,3i   are the marginal utilities of income in the three states, i.e. 
1 (1 ( ))y p    , 2 2(1 ( ))y p btz      and 3 (1 ( ))y p m     . 
Furthermore,   is the elasticity of health care demand with respect to its price 
in state 2, which we will define in absolute terms throughout the paper. 
 Equation (6) allows us to derive the result expressed in proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1: If 1  , * 1b  ; 
   if 1  , * 1b  ; 
   if 1  , * 1b  . 
 
Proposition 1 states that, in general, with 0  and 1 2 3, , 0    , the optimal 
co-insurance rate can be lower than, equal to, or higher than unity. Three cases 
are of special interest. It is useful to start with the case 0  where the 
marginal utility of income is constant across the three states and 1  . So there 
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is no need for risk sharing. However, it is efficient to eliminate moral hazard. 
Hence, the optimal co-insurance rate equals unity. 
Next, assume 0  and 1 2 30, 0, 0     . In this case, 1  . Co-
insurance implies a transfer from the state of bad health, state 2, to the state of 
perfect health, state 1. As the marginal utility of income is higher in the former 
state, this transfer in itself reduces expected utility. The optimal co-insurance 
rate is now less than unity, balancing the welfare loss from a lack of risk 
sharing with the welfare gain from a reduction of moral hazard. 
The third case is exactly the opposite of the second one. Assume 0  and 
1 2 30, 0, 0     . In this case, 1  . A higher co-insurance rate now 
implies higher transfers from the state of bad health, state 2, to the state of very 
bad health, state 3. As the marginal utility of income is highest in the latter 
state, this increase in transfers raises expected utility. The optimal co-insurance 
rate will now exceed unity, balancing the welfare gain from risk sharing with 
the welfare loss from an underconsumption of medical care. Obviously, in the 
real world we do not see schemes that feature co-insurance rates higher than 
unity. A rate higher than unity would run counter to the whole idea of 
insurance. If we impose therefore the restriction that the co-insurance rate 
cannot exceed unity, the third case becomes equivalent to the first case. 
Anticipating the result derived below that an optimal insurance scheme 
features a finite maximum, the second and third case thus illustrate that it may 
be optimal to have a deductible. This confirms the result of Drèze and 
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Schokkaert (2013) that Arrow (1963)’s theorem of the deductible can also hold 
true in a model with ex post moral hazard.3 
Equation (6) also tells us something about the relationship between the 
optimal co-insurance rate and the price elasticity of health care demand, if we 
assume that   can be treated as a constant. We will argue below that this is a 
useful assumption, but first present our result as proposition 2. 
 




























We distinguish the same three cases as before. In case 0  , the optimal co-
insurance rate equals unity, irrespective the value of the price elasticity of 
demand, which explains that * / 0b     if 1  . The second case with 0 
and 3 0   is more interesting. Then, the optimal co-insurance rate balances 
risk sharing and moral hazard. As has been derived before (Pauly 1968; 
Zeckhauser 1970; Besley 1988; Goldman and Philipson 2007; Zweifel, Breyer 
and Kifmann 2009; McGuire 2012)4, more elastic demand increases the optimal 
co-insurance rate in the direction of unity: * / 0b     if 1  . The third case 
 
3 Gollier (2000) shows that Arrow’s deductibility theorem can even be derived without assuming expected utility.  
4 Einav, Finkelstein and Polyakova (2016) find that this theoretical result also holds true in practice: coinsurance rates 
and price elasticities are positively correlated in the case of US Medicare Part D, i.e. insurance of prescription drugs in 
private insurance plans. 
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( 0  , 1 0  ) is again opposite to the second one. But if we impose the 
institutional requirement that the co-insurance rate cannot exceed unity, the 
third and first case again coincide. 
As mentioned above, proposition 2 assumes that   is a constant. This 
conflicts with the definition of   as a combination of three marginal utilities of 
income. However, we argue that realistic variations in   will not destroy 
proposition 2 for two reasons: 2btz  and m  are much smaller than y p  and   
is very small. 
As regards the former argument, one may argue that the marginal utilities of 
income in state 1, 2 and 3 will be close to each other. Indeed, disposable income 
y p  is generally much higher than health care spending below the cap, 2btz  , 
and also much higher than the co-payment maximum, m. Hence,   must be 
close to a constant. This holds true even for values of m close to y p , as the 
probability of state 3 is small relative to those of states 1 and 2. 
As regards the latter argument, observe that in the polar case case 0  ,   
is a constant. Hence, on the basis of a continuity argument,   will vary little 
for values of   close to zero. In model applications like the one in section 4 of 
this paper,   is very small (indeed, this must be the case as large values would 
violate the inequality condition in equation (1)). Furthermore, simulations made 
with a numerical version of the model in this section confirm that the variation 
in   becomes smaller, the lower is the value of  . 
Additionally, we have investigated the variability of   using a numerical 
version of the simple model in this section. These simulations (not included for 
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brevity) confirm that variations in the parameter (equation (3)) induce 
variations in   and   in the same direction, just as stated in proposition 2. 
 
2.3 The optimal co-insurance maximum 
As the price elasticity of health care demand relates negatively to health care 
spending,  imposing a cap makes health care demand below that cap more 
price-elastic. Following  proposition 2, we may state that if the insurance 
scheme features a deductible, introducing a cap on co-insurance will not affect 
the optimal co-insurance rate. But if the co-insurance rate is below one, the 
reform will increase it. 
What is the optimal co-insurance maximum? In order to explore this, we 
derive the first-order condition that corresponds to the maximization of 
expected utility with respect to the co-insurance maximum. 
Using *m  to denote the optimal co-insurance maximum, Appendix B derives 








   
        (7) 
Although equation (7) is not a reduced-form equation, it clearly indicates that 
the optimal co-insurance maximum must be finite.5 
Appendix B clarifies that two assumptions are required to derive equation 
(7): 0   and 1 0  . If we would instead assume that 0   would hold true, 
the co-insurance maximum would be undefined as insurance would have zero 
 
5 This result differs from the one reached by Manning and Marquis (1996). Using simulations, these authors were 
unable to find a plausible maximum. We suspect – as they do – that their assumption of a constant price elasticity plays a 
crucial role since the assumption that the price elasticity is decreasing in health status is crucial in our case. 
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value. If, instead, we would assume that 1 0  , 
*m would equal 2btz , which 
violates our definition of state 2 as one in which the patient pays less than the 
co-insurance maximum.6 
That the optimal co-insurance maximum is finite can be explained by 
describing a schedule wich allows the co-insurance rate to be different for 
different values of health status  . We hypothesize that this schedule would 
feature a co-insurance rate that is decreasing in  . For we know that the 
optimal co-insurance rate is increasing in   (proposition 2) and   is 
decreasing in   (see appendix A); moreover, Blomqvist (1997) has derived 
exactly this result. In this case the optimal co-insurance maximum thus balances 
the welfare loss from a too high rate just below the maximum against the 
welfare loss from a too low rate (namely zero) just above the maximum. This 
argument implies that the higher the optimal co-insurance rate, the higher will 
be the optimal co-insurance maximum. This is indeed what equation (7) 
suggests. One should note that this only holds true if the price elasticity of 
health care demand is below one in absolute terms. What we know from the 
literature is that this is a quite innocent assumption as price elasticities are in the 
order of 10 to 20 percent. 
  
3 A graphical illustration of the introduction of a cap 
Before moving to a continuous-state version of the model it is useful to present 
a graphical analysis of the likely effects of the introduction of a cap on co-
 
6 This result implies that state 3 that we defined as 0  and 1 2 30, 0, 0      in our discussion of propositions 1 and 
2 is incompatible with the model. This does not invalidate our discussion or any of the propositions as these do not rely on 
specific values for 1  (or 2  or 3 ).  
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insurance payments. Therefore, let us take a look at figure 1. This assumes a 
continuum of states and medical products. This figure displays hypothetical 
effects, namely how co-insurance payments would relate to the health status 
parameter   if the health insurance premium and the marginal utility of income 
were constant. Here, the line 0AB represents co-insurance payments in the case 
without a cap. The line 0DAC represents co-insurance payments in the case 
with a cap: it puts a cap of m on co-insurance payments and features a higher 
co-insurance rate (the line 0DE is steeper than the line 0AB). The line 0FGH 
measures the difference between 0DAC and 0AB. The figure shows that upon 
the introduction of a cap consumers with   higher than G  would gain and 
those with   lower than G  would lose. Further, consumers with   close to the 
level at which the cap starts to apply, F , would be worst off. 
In general, the welfare effects of the introduction of a cap do not coincide 
with the effects upon co-insurance payments. One reason is that the reform may 
change insurance premiums; another is that the marginal utility of income is not 
a constant. However, as verified by the simulations below,  figure 1 gives a 
good characterization of the shape of the welfare effects of a co-insurance cap. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE   
4 Optimal co-insurance in a continuous-state world 
 
4.1 Extensions of the model 
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This section extends the stylized model of section 2. In this more realistic 
model it is no longer possible to prove propositions 1 and 2. But, as we will see, 
simulations with this extended model indicate that also in this case both 
propositions still hold, and that the optimal co-insurance rate is below unity. 
Furthermore, the model enables to get an idea of the effects of the introduction 
of a cap on patient welfare.  
So, rather than assigning a unique value for the parameter   to each of the 
three states distinguished in section 2, we now assume that   is a stochastic 
parameter with continuous distribution function G(.). Consequently, the 
probabilities i  of specific co-insurance regimes (i.e. zero spending, spending 
lower than m, spending higher than m) are no longer fixed, but endogenous. 
Next, we extend the model by introducing two distinct patient groups; 
patients that incur costs of outpatient care only (the O-group) and patients who 
are also admitted to a hospital (A-group). We assume that the parameters of the 
distribution function of the health care parameter   differ between the two 
groups.  
It is important to note that ex ante all patients are equal. Each period patients 
receive two – uncorrelated – negative health shocks. The first shock indicates 
what kind of care the patient needs to improve his or her health status. Some of 
them will need no care at all. We name this the N-group (No care). Others need 
outpatient care only (the O-group), or use all care (A): both outpatient and 
inpatient care. The second shock determines a particular value for , which 
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indicates, as before, the size of the intervention that is required to restore the 
patient’s health status.  
As regards G(.), the distribution function of  , we assume the following. We  
write   as min min( )    , where min indicates a non-negative nonstochastic 
parameter that differs between the two groups7. min   is then assumed to be 
lognormally distributed. The parameters of this distribution differ between the 
O-group and the A-group. The value for the parameter min  in the two groups 
follows from calibrating the model to statistics for the consumption of O-care 
and A-care. 
In deciding about the co-insurance scheme, we assume that the government 
does not distinguish between O-care and A-care. Alternatively, the government 
may differentiate the co-insurance scheme between the two types of care. 
However, in that case, it would have been more difficult to defend our 
assumption that patients cannot decide which type of care to receive. 
 
4.2 Consumers 
In the cases of O-care and A-care, consumers face an optimization problem like 
in section 2: they decide on their demand for health care given the value of  . 
But now they do not know a priori which of the 3 cases (see equation (3)) will 
apply; that follows from their utility maximization. The budget constraint is 
kinked: if health care costs exceed the maximum of co-payments m, the out-of-
 
7 One may think of fixed costs, needed to refer patiens to outpatient ofr inpatient care. 
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pocket price drops to zero. Following the optimization procedure spelled out in 
Westerhout and Folmer (2013), one can derive the following expressions for 
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The condition 1 0   in equation (9) applies if the co-insurance maximum m 
exceeds some small minimum value. We do not explore the case in which the 
co-insurance maximum is below this minimum (this case does not occur in any 
of our simulations). Further, we make two observations. First, equation (9) 
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implicitly assumes that min 0  . In case min 0  , equation (9) applies as well, 
except for the corner solution 0z  . Second, in case of an unbounded co-
insurance scheme, 1  is infinite and hence the third segment of equations (9) 
and (10) does not apply.  
Expressions for co-insurance payments, non-medical consumption and 
indirect utility can be easily obtained by combining the expressions for health 
care demand in equation (9) with the budget constraint (2) and the direct utility 
function (1). For brevity, we do not report them here.  
 
4.3 Health insurers 
For both O-care and A-care we integrate the levels of consumer utility for all 
values of   to arrive at expressions for expected utility. Let Gi (.) denote the 
distribution function of ,mini i  (i = O, A), then: 
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Expressions for the conditional expectation variables ( | .)E v  in equation (12) 
are based upon the expression for indirect utility that corresponds to equation 
(9). 
Expected utility is a weighted average of ( )OE v , ( )AE v  and ( )NE v , 
 (1 ) ( ) (1 )(1 ) ( )N N N O O N O AV v E v E v           (13) 
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where Nv , utility in case of zero care, equals 
21
2( ) ( )y p y p   . 
The expression for the health insurance premium p  completes the model in 
this section. As before, this premium equals the difference between the 
aggregates of spending and co-insurance payments. 
 
4.4 Calibration 
We use observed relative sizes of the N-, O- and A-groups, and total 
copayments from a sample for the Netherlands. We apply estimated means and 
standard deviations of spending on outpatient and total care to the parameters of 
the distribution parameters of , ,k k O A  . The average coefficient of relative 
risk aversion is set at 2 (Garber and Phelps 1997). Price elasticities of O-care 
and A-care are -0.079 and -0.011 (corresponding to Van Vliet 2001). See 
Appendix C for more details. 
The estimated price elasticities are low as compared to the price elasticities  
from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (Newhouse and the Insurance 
Experiment Group, 1993). Below, we will explore the sensitivity of our results 
with respect to these price elasticities. 
 
4.5 Numerical simulations 
To estimate the optimal co-insurance rate for the unbounded scheme, we apply 
a grid search procedure in which we evaluate co-insurance rates in the range 
from 0% to 100% in steps of 5 percentage points. Table 1 shows that the 
optimal co-insurance rate is 30%. 
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We have performed a sensitivity analysis to explore how robust this result is 
(not reported for brevity). In particular, we have varied the degree of risk 
aversion, the price elasticities of demand, the standard deviations of the 
distributions of health status and the weight of outpatient care in total health 
care. The results display quite some variation: the co-insurance rate varies 
between 10% and 55%. On this point, our results are in line with Manning and 
Marquis (1996) who report a range for the optimal co-insurance rate from 25 to 
50%. Also, these results are in line with proposition 1: the optimal co-insurance 
rate will be below one if consumers are risk-averse, and the probability of 
consumers having to pay the maximum of co-insurance payments is zero.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 1 displays the effects of introducing a co-insurance maximum. Here 
again, we apply a grid procedure. Now we also vary the co-insurance 
maximum. For each value of the co-insurance rate, we explore the range from 
50 to 5000 euro. This globally locates the maximum. Then we repeat the 
procedure choosing values for m around the maximum from the first step, and 
so on. The reform results in a co-insurance maximum of about 3250 euro and a 
co-insurance rate of 55%. Corresponding to the introduction of the cap and in 
line with our analysis in section 2, the co-insurance rate thus increases (from 30 
to 55%). Co-insurance payments rise by about 40%, whereas aggregate health 
spending and health insurance premiums fall.  
  
23 
Average co-insurance payments for O-care and A-care increase as well. This 
may be surprising as the direct impact of putting a cap on co-insurance is a 
reduction in co-insurance payments. It appears that a sizeable fraction of the 
consumers of A-care spends less than the imposed maximum. These people 
face an increase of co-insurance payments on account of a higher co-insurance 
rate. This effect dominates the direct effect of the cap. 
To obtain a meaningful measure of the welfare gain, we calculate the 
compensating variation, i.e. the income loss that the average insured person 
would be willing to accept to prevent him from being moved to an alternative 
scheme. Formally, the compensating variation of the bounded scheme, By , is 
defined by the equality ( , , ) ( , , )B B B U UV b m y y V b m y  , where V denotes 
expected utility and Ub  and Um  are the co-insurance rate and maximum of the 
unbounded scheme and, similarly, Bb  and Bm  are the counterparts of the 
bounded scheme. We apply this definition at the insured population, to the O 
and A groups and to the individual level. We find that the compensating 
variation at the aggregate level is very modest: 9 euro per insured only. This 
aggregate welfare gain hides substantial transfers between groups of consumers. 
The consumers of A-care lose 201 euro, whereas the O-care patients gain 29 
euro. Both groups share the gain from lower insurance premiums, but the 
consumers of A-care suffer most from the increase in the co-insurance rate.  
The distribution of welfare effects indicates a lot of heterogeneity within the 
O and A groups. In both groups, the patient whose health care expenditures are 
close to  the co-payment maximum  is hurt most. The maximum individual loss 
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for a consumer in the O group amounts to 1,343 euro, whereas in the A group 
this maximum loss is 1,317 euro. 
The increase of the co-insurance rate due to  the introduction of the cap 
generates this uneven redistributional effects. If the co-insurance rate had been 
fixed to its pre-reform value, the maximum loss for a consumer in the O group 
would have dropped to 30 euro only, which contrasts sharply with the amount 
of 1,343 euro calculated earlier. 
These large numbers for the least well-off consumers are confirmed in our 
sensitivity analysis. Table 2 shows the results for eight alternative simulations.  
In most cases the maximum losses are very large, both for O-care and A-care. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
5 Concluding remarks 
 
Any analysis needs a lot of assumptions and our paper is no exception: we have 
assumed linear-quadratic preferences, no role for suppliers of health services 
and full information on part of consumers about their health status after health 
shocks have realized. We could have made alternative assumptions. However, 
as long as alternative preferences imply that health care consumption falls when 
its price increases, as long as health care demand has some effect upon 
consumption and as long as consumers have some information about their 
health status, our result that the distribution of welfare effects of the 
introduction of a co-insurance cap is very uneven, will probably survive, 
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provided that two assumptions are maintained. First, health care demand 
becomes less price-elastic when health status deteriorates and second, insurers 
increase the co-insurance rate when demand becomes more price-elastic. 
 
The authors declare that there are no potential conflicts of interest. 
This paper (or parts of it) has not been published before and has not been 
submitted to a different journal. 
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Figure 1: Co-insurance payments in the linear scheme and the scheme with a 













Table 1 Effects of reforming the co-insurance scheme 
         U B ( ) / (%)B U U  
Optimal co-insurance rate (%) 30 55 83.33 
Optimal co-insurance maximum 50,000 3,250 93.50 
Aggregate health care 
consumption 
15.82 15.26 -3.54 
- of which: O group 15.16 14.55 -4.02 
- of which: A group 23.44 23.39 -0.21 
Health care spending 942.27 925.07 -1.83 
Co-insurance payments 282.67 395.50 39.92 
Co-insurance payments, O group 132.55 224.42 69.31 
Co-insurance payments, A group 2,009.03 2,362.99 17.62 
Insurance premium 659.60 529.57 -19.71 
 
U: The optimal unbounded co-insurance scheme 





Table 2 Sensitivity analysis of the welfare loss of the least well-off patients 
 ˆ(%)b  m̂
 
   




 U B     
Benchmark (BM) 30 55 3,250 9 -1343 -1317 
0.50 BM   55 70 7,100 8 -1450 -1400 
1.50 BM   20 85 1,100 11 -690 -661 
,0.50i i BM   45 65 5,500 12 -1586 -719 
,1.50i i BM   20 85 1,150 8 -1513 -639 
,0.50i i BM   45 45 7,500 0 -4 -4 
,1.50i i BM   10 60 2,450 22 -1796 -1786 
,0.95O O BM   30 45 3,500 10 -1510 -1489 
,1.05O O BM   40 90 1,100 10 -1343 -1317 




U: The optimal unbounded co-insurance scheme 




Appendix A: Properties of the price elasticity of health care demand 
 
1 The price elasticity of health care demand is a decreasing function of   














Differentiate z with respect to bt  and divide the result by / ( )z bt  to find an expression 
for the price elasticity of health care demand  / ( ) / ( / ( ))p z bt z bt    : 
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     (A1) 
Equation (A1) uses the partial derivative / ( )z bt   to define the price elasticity. The 
elasticity   used in the main text is based on the total derivative / ( )dz d bt . The latter 
derivative includes also the effect of a change in out-of-pocket price upon health care 
demand through a change in insurance premiums. Numerically, the difference between 
the two elasticities is negligibly small. 
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     (A2) 
From this expression, it can easily be derived that 2/ 0p    . Hence, in absolute 
terms, the price elasticity of health care demand decreases upon an increase of the 
health status.  
 




Take equation (A2). The effect of an increase in bt is to increase the value of both the 
first and the second term, which enter into the expression for p  with a minus sign. 
Hence, upon an increase in bt n,  becomes more negative, i.e. / ( ) 0p bt   . 
 
3 The price elasticity of health care demand is a decreasing function of health 
spending tz  














Form this expression, it follows that 2( ) / 0tz    . 
Write the derivative of the price elasticity of health care demand with respect to health 












Given that / ( ) 0p tz    and that 2( ) / 0tz    , / ( ) 0p tz   . Hence, in absolute 






Appendix B: Derivation of the first-order conditions with respect to the 
coinsurance rate and the coinsurance maximum 
 
We start to elaborate the expression for expected utility (equation (5) in the main text) 
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 (B1) 
We use this equation to obtain the following version of the first-order condition with 
respect to the coinsurance rate: 
 
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 (B2) 
Collecting all /dp db  terms on the RHS and making use of the envelope theorem so 
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Equation (B4) can be further simplified. Note that the insurance contribution p  can be 
expressed as follows: 
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where   is defined as the (negative) of the price elasticity of health care demand in 
state 2, i.e. 2 2( / ) / ( / ( ))dz dbt z bt   . 
 Combining equations (B3) and (B6), dividing the result by 2 2tz  and 















To find the expression for the optimal coinsurance maximum, we differentiate the 
expression for expected utility (B1) with respect to m : 
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 (B8) 
Equation (B5) shows that 3/dp dm   . Substitution of this into equation (B8) gives 
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          (B9) 
Equation (B9) shows that for 0   the optimal coinsurance maximum is undefined. 
If 0   equation (7) in the main text results. Note that there is another regulatory 
condition that follows from the budget equation in the main text (equation 2): 2m btz . 
Basically, this says that for the model to be applicable, coinsurance payments in the 
second state must be sufficiently lower than the coinsurance maximum. Combining 
this with the optimal value of m from equation (B9) we obtain that 2 3/ (1 ) 1    or 





Appendix C: Calibration of model parameters 
 
The calibration upon data for the privately insured implies that in the sample insurance is 
complete, except for a deductible: the coinsurance rate equals 1. The maximum of coinsurance 
payments is chosen such that implied co-payments match the data. The probability of need for 
both inpatient and outpatient services, 
A , is measured by the ratio of the number of patients 
admitted to hospital to the total number of patients. We approximate this by the ratio of hospital 
admissions per patient. 
For both O care and A care, we assume that the medical need parameter   (in deviation 
from min ) is lognormally distributed. For calibration of the two lognormal distributions, we 
use the estimates in Van Vliet and Van der Burg (1996).  
Finally, the value of min is chosen such that the related health spending equals the sum of 
the costs of a one-day hospital admission, one consult of a medical specialist and one consult of 
a general practitioner. The latter is included as in The Netherlands it is required to visit a 
general practitioner before being allowed to consult a medical specialist. This amounts to 2000 
euro (data obtained from Statistics Netherlands: http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/). 
The remaining parameters cannot be directly computed from observed data. Therefore  we 
use  an iterative procedure to guarantee that the values of these unknown parameters are set 
such that the model meets observed data on a number of key variables. These observed key 
variables are:  
1. Total health care demand for both groups (O and A) 
2. The chosen value of the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA: 2); 
3. The price elasticity of demand for all outpatient services; 
4. The insurance effect corresponding to all care services: the demand of a fully insured 
patient divided by the demand of an uninsured patient;  
5. The observed probability of zero costs; 




Table C.1 summarizes the data used to calibrate the model. Table C.2 discusses economic 
features of the calibrated model. Table C.3 shows the allocation over different groups. It 
indicates that the number of consumers that ex post spend zero euros on health care is 
substantially higher than the probability of zero need: 2 percent. This is due to the fact that there 
is a large group of consumers that received a health shock that is so small that the benefits from 
health care consumption would be less than the costs involved.  
Table C.1 Validation of model parameters: data 
 Group O Group 
A 
Total 
Probability of zero health care spending (%)   22.1 
Probability of positive health care spending , A 
services (%) 
  8.0 
Insurance effect A group  1.04  
Price elasticity of health care demand, O group  0.079   
CRRA, non-health products   2.0 
Coefficient of variation health care spending 2.03 2.11  
Average demand health care services 14.5 24.9  
Real producer price health care services (euro) 24.4 239.4  
Real income per patient (euro)   35,321 
Average co-payments per patient (euro)   164 




Table C.2 Validation of model parameters: results 
 Group O Group 
A 
Total 
Probability of zero need: (%)N    2.0 
Relative size of the O group: (1 ) (%)N O     90.2 
Relative size of the A group: (1 ) (%)N A     8.0 
Parameter  in utility function   1.94 10-5 
Parameter   in utility function:   3.0 27.0  
Expectation of log( min  ):   3.051 5.845  
Standard deviation of log( min  ):   1.278 0.896  
Average need per patient:   /E    15.9 25.0  
Minimum need per patient: min /   0.0 5.5  
Average co-payments per patient   159 
Co-payment maximum 300 300  
Income elasticity health care consumption 0.16 0.0 0.15 
 
Table C.3 Allocation of the population to budget segments 








No need (%) 2.1  2.1   
Positive need for health 
care, O group (%) 
89.9 20.0 38.6 31.3 
Positive need for health 
care, A group (%) 
8.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 
 
